The Latest Security Firm “Tell all”

On the heels of Mandiant’s international sensation APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, we now have the Symantec report flamboyantly entitled Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link.

Have we now entered an era where Security Firms need to reveal their secrets in order to stay relevant and, perhaps more importantly, attract new customers? Or is it that these Security Firms regard more openness by them as better for the overall health and security of the cyber world than keeping their secrets secret?

Read the Symantec report:

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Filed under: Business, cyber security, cyber war, government, Intelligence Community, Internet, Politics, SCADA, Stuxnet, Technology, Threats, China, cyber world, international sensation, Iran, Natanz, nuclear news, Nuclear program of Iran, nuclear research facility, security, software, Stuxnet, Symantec, Technology, United States

Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Administration Trade Secret Strategy Rollout

Department of Justice
February 20, 2013

Thank you, Victoria, for those kind words – and thank you all for being here. It’s a pleasure to welcome you to the White House today – and a privilege to stand with so many friends, key partners, and indispensable allies in introducing the Administration’s strategy for combating the theft of trade secrets.

As Victoria just mentioned, this work is a top priority for President Obama, for the entire Administration – and of course for the dedicated men and women at the Department of Justice. I’m deeply proud of the contributions that my colleagues have made in developing this strategy – and the pivotal role that the Department will play in its implementation. And I’m confident that – as we bring government agencies and additional private sector partners together to put these plans into action – we’ll continue strengthening national efforts to protect the rights, safety, and best interests of American consumers, innovators, and entrepreneurs.

Particularly in this time of ongoing economic recovery, this work is more important than ever. Despite the challenges of recent years, American companies remain the most innovative in the world. They are responsible for many of the most important technological advances the world has ever seen, an overwhelming number of the 100 most valuable brands, and almost 30 percent of global research and development spending.

This level of innovation and the investments that make it possible benefit consumers, create jobs, and support our economy. For instance, in 2011, companies in Silicon Valley added over 42,000 jobs and recorded a growth rate more than three times that of the U.S. economy as a whole. But, as any of the corporate leaders in this crowd can attest, this prosperity is a double-edged sword. And it inevitably attracts global rivals – including individuals, companies, and even countries – eager to tilt the playing field to their advantage.

By corrupting insiders, hiring hackers, and engaging in other unscrupulous and illegal activities, these entities can inflict devastating harm on individual creators, start-ups, and major companies. As one private security expert has said of the largest U.S. corporations, there are only “two categories” of companies affected by trade secret theft – “[T]hose that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t know yet.”

This is because, as new technologies have torn down traditional barriers to international business and global commerce, they’ve also made it easier for criminals to steal trade secrets – and to do so from anywhere in the world. A hacker in China can acquire source code from a software company in Virginia without leaving his or her desk. With a few keystrokes, a terminated or simply unhappy employee of a defense contractor can misappropriate designs, processes, and formulas worth billions of dollars.

Some of these criminals exploit pilfered secrets themselves – often by extorting the victim company or starting their own enterprise. Others try to sell the illicit information to a rival company, or obtain a bounty from a country interested in encouraging such theft. And all represent a significant and steadily increasing threat to America’s economic and national security interests.

Fortunately, the women and men of the Justice Department are working tirelessly to prevent, combat, and punish these serious crimes. Thanks to the efforts of 40 prosecutors and four computer forensic experts serving in the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, and more than 230 specially-trained prosecutors stationed at U.S. Attorneys’ Offices around the country, including 25 Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property – or “CHIP” – units, I’m pleased to report that we’re fighting back more aggressively, and collaboratively, than ever before. And with approximately 240 FBI agents in the field dedicated to investigating IP crime, along with officials from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 20 additional state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies that are partners at the IPR Center, we are poised to build on our recent successes.

I’m proud of the outstanding work that these professionals are leading every day, in offices all across the country. But I also recognize – as I know you all do – that the Justice Department won’t be able to continue making the progress we need, and that our citizens and companies deserve, on its own.

We need to increase cooperation and coordination between partners at every level of government. We need to improve engagement with the corporations represented in the room today. We need to find ways to work together more efficiently and effectively – by following the road map set forth in the Administration’s new, comprehensive strategy. And we need to do so starting immediately – because continuing technological expansion and accelerating globalization will lead to a dramatic increase in the threat posed by trade secret theft in the years ahead.

In fact, by 2015, experts believe that the number of smart phones, tablets, laptops, and other internet-access devices in use will be roughly double the total that existed in 2010. In the same period, the proliferation of cloud-based computing will significantly enhance flexibility and productivity for workers around the world. But these same forces will also create more access points and vulnerabilities that allow criminals to steal confidential information.

Just as increasing globalization will enable American companies of all sizes to benefit from foreign technical experts and research and development activities in other countries, the sharing of trade secrets with entities operating in nations with weak rule of law may expose them to intellectual property losses. Any resulting cost advantages will likely be more than offset by losses in proprietary company information.

Unfortunately, these projections aren’t merely hypothetical. We’ve seen this phenomenon before – including in the late 1990s, when I had the privilege of serving as Deputy Attorney General. Between 1997 and 2000, internet usage in the United States more than doubled – and this massive technological shift also brought about major changes in the nature of crime. For instance, in 1999 alone, we saw a 30-percent spike in intellectual property cases over the previous year. In order to fight back, in July of that year I announced the Department’s first major IP Strategy, known as the Intellectual Property Rights Initiative.

Of course, we’ve all come a long way since then. As critical technologies have advanced, criminals have adapted accordingly. Our need to keep pace with these changes remains imperative. And the stakes have never been higher.

In some industries, a single trade secret can be worth millions – or even billions – of dollars. Trade secret theft can require companies to lay off employees, to close factories, to lose sales and profits, to experience a decline in competitive position and advantage – or even to go out of business. And this type of crime can have significant impacts not only on our country’s economic well-being, but on our national security – allowing hostile states to obtain data and technology that could endanger American lives; expose our energy, financial, or other sensitive sectors to massive losses; or make our infrastructure vulnerable to attack.

In response, the Justice Department has made the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft a top priority. This is why the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section has taken a leading role in economic espionage cases – and others affecting national security and the export of military and strategic commodities or technology. It’s also why, in 2010, I established an internal Task Force on Intellectual Property – led by Deputy Attorney General Jim Cole and other senior Department leaders – to improve and expand our enforcement efforts in this area. And it’s why the FBI has increased its focus on trade secret theft and its use of sophisticated tools and techniques in conducting national security and criminal investigations.

Of course, most trade secret matters are dealt with in civil court. But when the Justice Department receives referrals, we investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute those matters fairly and completely. And, although the primary legislation creating criminal liability for these acts is less than 20 years old, federal law enforcement officials have established a remarkable record of success in this area.

In the decade between 2001 and 2011, we secured well over 100 convictions in cases involving criminal trade secret thefts, and 6 convictions in economic espionage cases. For instance, in December 2011, a federal court in Indiana sentenced a man from China to more than 7 years in prison – after his conviction on charges of economic espionage on behalf of a foreign university tied to the Chinese government. Last September – in New Jersey – a jury convicted another Chinese native of trade secret theft and other charges for stealing information from a defense contractor about the performance and guidance systems for missiles and other military hardware. And last November – in Michigan – a former General Motors engineer and her husband were convicted of conspiring to steal more than $40 million worth of trade secrets from GM, with intent to use them in a joint venture with an automotive competitor in China.

In these and many other cases – as we’ve refined our approach and increased our understanding of these crimes and those who commit them – the Department has also gathered valuable intelligence about foreign-based economic espionage. We’ve forged strong relationships with law enforcement partners, private sector experts, and international allies. And we’ve begun to raise awareness about the devastating impact of these crimes – and to encourage companies to report suspected breaches to law enforcement – so violators can be caught, brought to justice, and kept from striking again.

As we carry this work into the future – thanks to the support and assistance of everyone here today, and the cutting-edge strategy we’re committed to implementing – I’m confident that we’ll continue to make great strides in the fight against trade secret theft. We’ll keep improving our ability to crack down on intellectual property infringement and economic espionage. And together we’ll ensure that the United States is, and always will be, the world leader in innovation.

/////////////////

Attendees of the Justice Department announcement received copies of the following report:

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Filed under: Business, China, cyber security, Doctrine, government, Internet, News, Policy, Politics, Strategy, Technology, Threats, business, China, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, economy, Eric Holder, Federal Bureau of Investigation, government, Internet, Justice Department, politics, Technology, Trade secret, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States, White House

Former CIA Director Talks Cyber Security

Former National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency Director General Michael Hayden discusses life as the nation’s premier spy, as well the pressing cyber and national security issues of the day, with Frank Sesno, Director of George Washington University‘s School of Media and Public Affairs. This event took place February 19, 2013, and was recorded by CSPAN.

One of the first topics they discuss is the huge load of evidential data the information security company Mandiant recently released that alleges the Chinese government, through its military, is complicit in persistent cyber espionage against the United States government and corporations.

Not-so breaking news, folks: According to General Hayden, the United States steals China‘s secrets, too. However, he goes on to differentiate the type of espionage between the two nations. He regards the United States’s spying against the Chinese government as being done only to protect the United States’s citizens’s liberty and security; whereas the Chinese spying is being done against the United States primarily to steal its corporate and national secrets to improve China’s industrial and technological capacity and strength.

Unfortunately, CSPAN offers no embeddable file for the event so you will need to watch it at www.c-spanvideo.org/program/311052-1

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Filed under: Analysis, cyber security, cyber war, Doctrine, government, Intelligence Community, Internet, Military, News, Terrorism, Threats, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, cyber security, Frank Sesno, George Washington University, Mandiant, Michael Hayden, National Security Agency, NSA, United States

China Responds To Mandiant Accusations Through State Media

Xinhua
February 20,2013

China defense ministry refutes cyber attack allegations

China’s military spokesman said on Wednesday that the country’s armed forces had never backed any hacking activities, denouncing U.S. cyber security firm Mandiant’s report as groundless both in facts and legal basis.

China’s laws ban any activities disrupting cyber security and the Chinese government always cracks down on cyber crimes, Geng Yansheng, spokesman with the Ministry of National Defense, said at a briefing.

Mandiant on Monday released a report which alleged that a secret Chinese military unit in Shanghai was behind years of cyber attacks against U.S. companies.

Geng said Mandiant’s report was groundless in fact because it came to the conclusion that the source of attack came from China simply because of the discovery that attacks were linked to IP addresses based in China.

First, as known to all, it is so common for hacking attacks on the Internet to take place by peculating IP addresses that “it happens almost everyday,” according to the spokesman.

Second, there has been no clear and consistent definition of cyber attacks around the world. The report lacks legal basis to assert cyber espionage only by cataloguing some routine cyber activities, he said.

Third, cyber attacks are transnational, anonymous and deceptive with their source often difficult to identify. Releasing irresponsible information will not help solve problems, Geng added.

The spokesman further said China actually is a major victim of cyber attacks.

[Continue reading...]

Filed under: China, cyber war, government, Internet, Military, News, Chinese military, cyber attack, cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber security, Mandiant

Congressional Open Hearing: Cyber Threats and Ongoing Efforts to Protect the Nation

Mandiant’s groundbreaking report that alleges China’s government is responsible for persistent, long-term hacking and cyber espionage, has the following quote:

“China’s economic espionage has reached an intolerable level and I believe that the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have an obligation to confront Beijing and demand that they put a stop to this piracy. Beijing is waging a massive trade war on us all, and we should band together to pressure them to stop. Combined, the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have significant diplomatic and economic leverage over China, and we should use this to our advantage to put an end to this scourge.”

— U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers, October, 2011

Representative Rogers’ quote comes from this congressional testimony:

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Chairman Mike Rogers Opening Statement
Open Hearing: Cyber Threats and Ongoing Efforts to Protect the Nation
October 4, 2011

*Remarks as Prepared

Introduction: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence meets today in open session to convene a hearing on cyber threats and ongoing efforts to protect the nation. There are a wide range of cyber issues being debated these days. I would like to focus our discussion at today’s hearing, however, on cyber information sharing, and in particular, what the Intelligence Community might be able to do to assist the private sector in defending their networks.

The Speaker has asked Congressman Mac Thornberry of this Committee to lead the efforts of the House on the broader range of important cyber security issues, and his Task Force has done some very important work in thinking through some of these difficult problems. He has the full support of the House Intelligence Committee as he does his work, and I hope this hearing will be of benefit to the work of the Task Force.

Our witnesses for today’s hearing are The Honorable Michael Hayden, Mr. Arthur Coviello, and Mr. Kevin Mandia.

General Hayden has had a very long and distinguished military career. His assignments include serving as director of the National Security Agency, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also served as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and he is no stranger to the significant cyber threats we face from nation states like China.

Mr. Coviello is the Executive Chairman of RSA Corporation, a company which plays an important role in helping secure both private and government networks and systems.

RSA’s business alone would probably be sufficient to qualify him to testify before the Committee on cyber, but RSA was also the target of a significant cyber attack recently, and therefore serves as a useful case study of the state of our cyber security efforts.

Mr. Kevin Mandia is the Chief Executive Officer of MANDIANT, an industry leader in cyber incident response and computer forensics. Mr. Mandia deals with the consequences of advanced cyber espionage against American companies every day, and we look forward to his observations on the threats we face, as well as what we can do to better cope with them.

Read the complete testimony at the U.S. House of Representatives website.

Filed under: Business, China, government, Intelligence Community, Internet, Politics, Technology, Threats, China, Congress, congressional testimony, cyber attack, cyber crime, cyber security, cyber war, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community, Mandiant, Representative Mike Rogers

Mandiant Exposes Persisten Hacking Authorized By Chinese Government

Mandiant, an information security company, has been in the news lately as the go-to cybersecurity company after high profile newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, and others were allegedly attacked by Chinese hackers. The New York Times alleged they were attached by China in retribution for the newspaper exposing government corruption at the highest levels.

Today, Mandiant has done something unusual for the hyper-secret world of cyber espionage and counter-espionage: they went public with accusatory reports and videos that shows a “day in the life” of a typical Chinese hacker.

The following is available from Mandiant’s website:

From the report:

Since 2004, Mandiant has investigated computer security breaches at hundreds of organizations around the world. The majority of these security breaches are attributed to advanced threat actors referred to as the “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT). We first published details about the APT in our January 2010 M-Trends report. As we stated in the report, our position was that “The Chinese government may authorize this activity, but there’s no way to determine the extent of its involvement.” Now, three years later, we have the evidence required to change our assessment. The details we have analyzed during hundreds of investigations convince us that the groups conducting these activities are based primarily in China and that the Chinese Government is aware of them.

Read the full report:

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Filed under: Analysis, Business, China, cyber security, cyber war, government, Military, News, Technology, Threats, Advanced persistent threat, ATP1, China, Chinese government, cyber crime, cyber security, cyber war, cyber warfare, Internet, Mandiant, New York Times, People's Liberation Army, United States, Washington Post

Obama’s Cybersecurity Executive Order: A Pirate Party Analysis

RussiaToday
February 13, 2013

Filed under: Analysis, cyber security, government, Internet, News, Technology, Executive Order, Internet, Pirate Party, RussiaToday, Technology

Improving the Security of the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure

White House
February 13, 2013

The Nation increasingly relies on the Internet to run the systems that light our houses, provide gas for our cars, and ensure our water is safe to drink. Collectively, these diverse systems represent our cyber critical infrastructure. Linking our critical infrastructure to the Internet brings considerable benefits, but our daily reliance on this critical infrastructure means that we are vulnerable to disruptions in our ability to use it. Unfortunately, the threats against our cyber critical infrastructure are numerous, ranging from sophisticated nation states to common criminals.

The government’s senior-most civilian, military, and intelligence professionals all agree that inadequate cybersecurity within this critical infrastructure poses a grave threat to the security of the United States. Most recently, we have seen an increased interest in targeting public and private critical infrastructure systems by actors who seek to threaten our national and economic security. Along with dissuading their actions, we must better protect the critical systems that support our way of life.

[Continue reading...]

Filed under: government, climate, critical infrastructure, cyber security, economic security, Internet, intrastructure, politics, science, Technology

Executive Order — Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

White House
February 12, 2013

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- – - – - – -

IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. Repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure demonstrate the need for improved cybersecurity. The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges we must confront. The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats. It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties. We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk-based standards.

Sec. 2. Critical Infrastructure. As used in this order, the term critical infrastructure means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

Sec. 3. Policy Coordination. Policy coordination, guidance, dispute resolution, and periodic in-progress reviews for the functions and programs described and assigned herein shall be provided through the interagency process established in Presidential Policy Directive-1 of February 13, 2009 (Organization of the National Security Council System), or any successor.

Sec. 4. Cybersecurity Information Sharing. (a) It is the policy of the United States Government to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with U.S. private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and defend themselves against cyber threats. Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security (the “Secretary”), and the Director of National Intelligence shall each issue instructions consistent with their authorities and with the requirements of section 12(c) of this order to ensure the timely production of unclassified reports of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland that identify a specific targeted entity. The instructions shall address the need to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations.

(b) The Secretary and the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a process that rapidly disseminates the reports produced pursuant to section 4(a) of this order to the targeted entity. Such process shall also, consistent with the need to protect national security information, include the dissemination of classified reports to critical infrastructure entities authorized to receive them. The Secretary and the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a system for tracking the production, dissemination, and disposition of these reports.

(c) To assist the owners and operators of critical infrastructure in protecting their systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, or harm, the Secretary, consistent with 6 U.S.C. 143 and in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, shall, within 120 days of the date of this order, establish procedures to expand the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program to all critical infrastructure sectors. This voluntary information sharing program will provide classified cyber threat and technical information from the Government to eligible critical infrastructure companies or commercial service providers that offer security services to critical infrastructure.

(d) The Secretary, as the Executive Agent for the Classified National Security Information Program created under Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010 (Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities), shall expedite the processing of security clearances to appropriate personnel employed by critical infrastructure owners and operators, prioritizing the critical infrastructure identified in section 9 of this order.

(e) In order to maximize the utility of cyber threat information sharing with the private sector, the Secretary shall expand the use of programs that bring private sector subject-matter experts into Federal service on a temporary basis. These subject matter experts should provide advice regarding the content, structure, and types of information most useful to critical infrastructure owners and operators in reducing and mitigating cyber risks.

Sec. 5. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protections. (a) Agencies shall coordinate their activities under this order with their senior agency officials for privacy and civil liberties and ensure that privacy and civil liberties protections are incorporated into such activities. Such protections shall be based upon the Fair Information Practice Principles and other privacy and civil liberties policies, principles, and frameworks as they apply to each agency’s activities.

(b) The Chief Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall assess the privacy and civil liberties risks of the functions and programs undertaken by DHS as called for in this order and shall recommend to the Secretary ways to minimize or mitigate such risks, in a publicly available report, to be released within 1 year of the date of this order. Senior agency privacy and civil liberties officials for other agencies engaged in activities under this order shall conduct assessments of their agency activities and provide those assessments to DHS for consideration and inclusion in the report. The report shall be reviewed on an annual basis and revised as necessary. The report may contain a classified annex if necessary. Assessments shall include evaluation of activities against the Fair Information Practice Principles and other applicable privacy and civil liberties policies, principles, and frameworks. Agencies shall consider the assessments and recommendations of the report in implementing privacy and civil liberties protections for agency activities.

(c) In producing the report required under subsection (b) of this section, the Chief Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of DHS shall consult with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

(d) Information submitted voluntarily in accordance with 6 U.S.C. 133 by private entities under this order shall be protected from disclosure to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Sec. 6. Consultative Process. The Secretary shall establish a consultative process to coordinate improvements to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. As part of the consultative process, the Secretary shall engage and consider the advice, on matters set forth in this order, of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council; Sector Coordinating Councils; critical infrastructure owners and operators; Sector-Specific Agencies; other relevant agencies; independent regulatory agencies; State, local, territorial, and tribal governments; universities; and outside experts.

Sec. 7. Baseline Framework to Reduce Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure. (a) The Secretary of Commerce shall direct the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (the “Director”) to lead the development of a framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure (the “Cybersecurity Framework”). The Cybersecurity Framework shall include a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks. The Cybersecurity Framework shall incorporate voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest extent possible. The Cybersecurity Framework shall be consistent with voluntary international standards when such international standards will advance the objectives of this order, and shall meet the requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 271 et seq.), the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-113), and OMB Circular A-119, as revised.

(b) The Cybersecurity Framework shall provide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including information security measures and controls, to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage cyber risk. The Cybersecurity Framework shall focus on identifying cross-sector security standards and guidelines applicable to critical infrastructure. The Cybersecurity Framework will also identify areas for improvement that should be addressed through future collaboration with particular sectors and standards-developing organizations. To enable technical innovation and account for organizational differences, the Cybersecurity Framework will provide guidance that is technology neutral and that enables critical infrastructure sectors to benefit from a competitive market for products and services that meet the standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes developed to address cyber risks. The Cybersecurity Framework shall include guidance for measuring the performance of an entity in implementing the Cybersecurity Framework.

(c) The Cybersecurity Framework shall include methodologies to identify and mitigate impacts of the Cybersecurity Framework and associated information security measures or controls on business confidentiality, and to protect individual privacy and civil liberties.

(d) In developing the Cybersecurity Framework, the Director shall engage in an open public review and comment process. The Director shall also consult with the Secretary, the National Security Agency, Sector-Specific Agencies and other interested agencies including OMB, owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other stakeholders through the consultative process established in section 6 of this order. The Secretary, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies shall provide threat and vulnerability information and technical expertise to inform the development of the Cybersecurity Framework. The Secretary shall provide performance goals for the Cybersecurity Framework informed by work under section 9 of this order.

(e) Within 240 days of the date of this order, the Director shall publish a preliminary version of the Cybersecurity Framework (the “preliminary Framework”). Within 1 year of the date of this order, and after coordination with the Secretary to ensure suitability under section 8 of this order, the Director shall publish a final version of the Cybersecurity Framework (the “final Framework”).

(f) Consistent with statutory responsibilities, the Director will ensure the Cybersecurity Framework and related guidance is reviewed and updated as necessary, taking into consideration technological changes, changes in cyber risks, operational feedback from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, experience from the implementation of section 8 of this order, and any other relevant factors.

Sec. 8. Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program. (a) The Secretary, in coordination with Sector-Specific Agencies, shall establish a voluntary program to support the adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework by owners and operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested entities (the “Program”).

(b) Sector-Specific Agencies, in consultation with the Secretary and other interested agencies, shall coordinate with the Sector Coordinating Councils to review the Cybersecurity Framework and, if necessary, develop implementation guidance or supplemental materials to address sector-specific risks and operating environments.

(c) Sector-Specific Agencies shall report annually to the President, through the Secretary, on the extent to which owners and operators notified under section 9 of this order are participating in the Program.

(d) The Secretary shall coordinate establishment of a set of incentives designed to promote participation in the Program. Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce each shall make recommendations separately to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, that shall include analysis of the benefits and relative effectiveness of such incentives, and whether the incentives would require legislation or can be provided under existing law and authorities to participants in the Program.

(e) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, shall make recommendations to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, on the feasibility, security benefits, and relative merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and contract administration. The report shall address what steps can be taken to harmonize and make consistent existing procurement requirements related to cybersecurity.

Sec. 9. Identification of Critical Infrastructure at Greatest Risk. (a) Within 150 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall use a risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. In identifying critical infrastructure for this purpose, the Secretary shall use the consultative process established in section 6 of this order and draw upon the expertise of Sector-Specific Agencies. The Secretary shall apply consistent, objective criteria in identifying such critical infrastructure. The Secretary shall not identify any commercial information technology products or consumer information technology services under this section. The Secretary shall review and update the list of identified critical infrastructure under this section on an annual basis, and provide such list to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs.

(b) Heads of Sector-Specific Agencies and other relevant agencies shall provide the Secretary with information necessary to carry out the responsibilities under this section. The Secretary shall develop a process for other relevant stakeholders to submit information to assist in making the identifications required in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) The Secretary, in coordination with Sector-Specific Agencies, shall confidentially notify owners and operators of critical infrastructure identified under subsection (a) of this section that they have been so identified, and ensure identified owners and operators are provided the basis for the determination. The Secretary shall establish a process through which owners and operators of critical infrastructure may submit relevant information and request reconsideration of identifications under subsection (a) of this section.

Sec. 10. Adoption of Framework. (a) Agencies with responsibility for regulating the security of critical infrastructure shall engage in a consultative process with DHS, OMB, and the National Security Staff to review the preliminary Cybersecurity Framework and determine if current cybersecurity regulatory requirements are sufficient given current and projected risks. In making such determination, these agencies shall consider the identification of critical infrastructure required under section 9 of this order. Within 90 days of the publication of the preliminary Framework, these agencies shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the Director of OMB, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, that states whether or not the agency has clear authority to establish requirements based upon the Cybersecurity Framework to sufficiently address current and projected cyber risks to critical infrastructure, the existing authorities identified, and any additional authority required.

(b) If current regulatory requirements are deemed to be insufficient, within 90 days of publication of the final Framework, agencies identified in subsection (a) of this section shall propose prioritized, risk-based, efficient, and coordinated actions, consistent with Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993 (Regulatory Planning and Review), Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and Executive Order 13609 of May 1, 2012 (Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation), to mitigate cyber risk.

(c) Within 2 years after publication of the final Framework, consistent with Executive Order 13563 and Executive Order 13610 of May 10, 2012 (Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens), agencies identified in subsection (a) of this section shall, in consultation with owners and operators of critical infrastructure, report to OMB on any critical infrastructure subject to ineffective, conflicting, or excessively burdensome cybersecurity requirements. This report shall describe efforts made by agencies, and make recommendations for further actions, to minimize or eliminate such requirements.

(d) The Secretary shall coordinate the provision of technical assistance to agencies identified in subsection (a) of this section on the development of their cybersecurity workforce and programs.

(e) Independent regulatory agencies with responsibility for regulating the security of critical infrastructure are encouraged to engage in a consultative process with the Secretary, relevant Sector-Specific Agencies, and other affected parties to consider prioritized actions to mitigate cyber risks for critical infrastructure consistent with their authorities.

Sec. 11. Definitions. (a) “Agency” means any authority of the United States that is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5).

(b) “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council” means the council established by DHS under 6 U.S.C. 451 to facilitate effective interaction and coordination of critical infrastructure protection activities among the Federal Government; the private sector; and State, local, territorial, and tribal governments.

(c) “Fair Information Practice Principles” means the eight principles set forth in Appendix A of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.

(d) “Independent regulatory agency” has the meaning given the term in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5).

(e) “Sector Coordinating Council” means a private sector coordinating council composed of representatives of owners and operators within a particular sector of critical infrastructure established by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan or any successor.

(f) “Sector-Specific Agency” has the meaning given the term in Presidential Policy Directive-21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience), or any successor.

Sec. 12. General Provisions. (a) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. Nothing in this order shall be construed to provide an agency with authority for regulating the security of critical infrastructure in addition to or to a greater extent than the authority the agency has under existing law. Nothing in this order shall be construed to alter or limit any authority or responsibility of an agency under existing law.

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(c) All actions taken pursuant to this order shall be consistent with requirements and authorities to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods. Nothing in this order shall be interpreted to supersede measures established under authority of law to protect the security and integrity of specific activities and associations that are in direct support of intelligence and law enforcement operations.

(d) This order shall be implemented consistent with U.S. international obligations.

(e) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA

Filed under: cyber security, Doctrine, government, SCADA, cyber security, Homeland Security, Obama

Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United States

White House
February 5, 2013

The American public increasingly relies on the Internet for socializing, business transactions, gathering information, entertainment, and creating and sharing content. The rapid growth of the Internet has brought opportunities but also risks, and the Federal Government is committed to empowering members of the public to protect themselves against the full range of online threats, including online radicalization to violence.

Violent extremist groups ─ like al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, violent supremacist groups, and violent “sovereign citizens” ─ are leveraging online tools and resources to propagate messages of violence and division. These groups use the Internet to disseminate propaganda, identify and groom potential recruits, and supplement their real-world recruitment efforts.  Some members and supporters of these groups visit mainstream fora to see whether individuals might be recruited or encouraged to commit acts of violence, look for opportunities to draw targets into private exchanges, and exploit popular media like music videos and online video games.  Although the Internet offers countless opportunities for Americans to connect, it has also provided violent extremists with access to new audiences and instruments for radicalization.

[Continue reading...]

Filed under: cyber security, cyber war, Life, Policy, Strategy, Terrorism, gaming, Internet, libya, Middle East, politics, videogames

Spies give way to ‘sexy’ social media

ODNI
August 2, 2012

Gathering intelligence from social media has finally become as “sexy” as more traditional clandestine methods.

Open source intelligence — generally regarded as information gathered through methods other than clandestine activity — is the “hot new field” in the intelligence community, said Patrick O’Neil, director of analytic development at the Open Source Center (OSC) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Intelligence agencies are developing their capabilities to gather useful information by scouring social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.

The amount of data available continues to grow from the inclusion of these non-traditional sources. As a result, members of the intelligence community must develop new tools and best practices to analyze the information.

There are opportunities involved, but there also are challenges in the process of adjusting to the shift, as O’Neil and two other panelists discussed at the event hosted by the Government Executive Media Group and the Intelligence and National Security Alliance in Washington Tuesday.

O’Neil said the Director of National Intelligence has chosen the Open Source Center to act as the intelligence community’s functional manager for open source intelligence and to coordinate resources and methodologies between governmental agencies.

“Our goal is to collect information once and distribute it to everybody in the government who needs it,” O’Neil said.

Filed under: cyber security, government, Intelligence Community, Internet, climate, cyber crime, enterprise-it, Internet, it-security, ODNI, science, Technology

Stuxnet: The New Face of 21st Century Cyber Warfare Infographic

Infographic by Veracode Application Security

Filed under: cyber security, cyber war, government, Intelligence Community, Internet, Military, Stuxnet, Threats, War, Iran, Israel, Stuxnet, United States

Obama may act to stop cyberattacks

Navy Times
August 9, 2012

“I think the administration is seriously frustrated over the lack of “I think the administration is seriously frustrated over the lack of congressional action and may decide they have no choice” but to act congressional action and may decide they have no choice” but to act administratively, said Roger Cressey, who served as a cybersecurity and administratively, said Roger Cressey, who served as a cybersecurity and counterterrorism adviser in the Clinton and George W. Bush counterterrorism adviser in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. administrations.

Cressey, now a senior vice president at the Booz Allen Hamilton consulting Cressey, now a senior vice president at the Booz Allen Hamilton consulting firm, said the administration was weighing a number of options, including firm, said the administration was weighing a number of options, including offering incentives, such as liability protection, to entice industry to opt-in offering incentives, such as liability protection, to entice industry to opt-in to voluntary computer security standards. He said there likely would be to voluntary computer security standards. He said there likely would be more conversations about the issue after Congress returns in September more conversations about the issue after Congress returns in September before the White House takes any action. before the White House takes any action.

Filed under: cyber security, cyber war, government, Internet, Policy, Politics, Congress, cyberattacks, Obama Administration, President Obama

An “Horrendous Risk” In Action

Wired tech writer Mat Honan provides heart-stopping but timely insight into what Steve Wozniak’s horrendous cloud risks look like:

In the space of one hour, my entire digital life was destroyed. First my Google account was taken over, then deleted. Next my Twitter account was compromised, and used as a platform to broadcast racist and homophobic messages. And worst of all, my AppleID account was broken into, and my hackers used it to remotely erase all of the data on my iPhone, iPad, and MacBook.

Continue reading, if you dare, at Wired

Filed under: Business, cyber security, Internet, Life, News, Polls, Technology, Apple, cloud comuting, cyber crime, cyber security, Google, hacker, hackers, hacking, homophobic, iPad, iPhone, MacBook, Mat Honan, Steve Wozniak, Technology, the cloud, Twitter, Wired

Wozniak Warns of “Horrendous” Cloud Risks

The Telegraph
August 6, 2012

Wozniak told an audience in Washington DC: “I really worry about everything going into the cloud. I think it’s going to be horrendous. I think there are going to be a lot of horrible problems in the next five years.”

Steve Wozniak, who co-founded Apple with Steve Jobs in 1976, was speaking after a performance of The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs, a monologue about working conditions at Apple’s Chinese factories.

Read more at The Telegraph

Filed under: cyber security, Internet, Life, News, Polls, Technology, Apple, chinese factories, cloud computing, cyber crime, cyber security, Internet, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Technology, the cloud, working conditions

It May Not Be the Result of Cyber Warfare

…but India’s recent massive power outage, which affected more than 700 million people, certainly is a glimpse at what havoc effective cyber warfare can potentially inflict on a country’s electrical grid and, more importantly, its population.

Mumbai Skylines

Filed under: cyber war, government, SCADA, cyber war, cyber warfare, electrical grid, India, power grid, power outage

Senate Denies Cyber Security Bill

According to the Associated Press, the Senate has failed to pass the much-needed Cyber Security Legislation.

 

 

Filed under: cyber security, government, Politics, associated press, cyber attack, cyber crime, cyber security, government, politics, security legislation, senate, undefined, United States Senate, US president

Department of Defense Cyber Strategy

U.S. Department of Defense
July 14, 2011

It should come as no surprise that the United States is prepared to defend itself. It would be irresponsible, and a failure of the Defense Department’s mission, to leave the nation vulnerable to a known threat. Just as our military organizes to defend against hostile acts from land, air, and sea, we must also be prepared to respond to hostile acts in cyberspace. Accordingly, the United States reserves the right, under the laws of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber attacks with a proportional and justified military response at the time and place of our choosing.

Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,

Read the speech at Defense.gov

Filed under: cyber security, Doctrine, Intelligence Community, Internet, Military, Policy, armed conflict, cyber attack, cyber crime, cyber security, cyber war, DoD, hostile acts, Intelligence Community, libya, military response, National Security, politics, undefined

President Obama Names Vivek Kundra Chief Information Officer

The White House
March 5, 2009

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, President Barack Obama named Vivek Kundra the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) at the White House.

The Federal Chief Information Officer directs the policy and strategic planning of federal information technology investments and is responsible for oversight of federal technology spending. The Federal CIO establishes and oversees enterprise architecture to ensure system interoperability and information sharing and ensure information security and privacy across the federal government. The CIO will also work closely with the Chief Technology Officer to advance the President’s technology agenda.

President Obama said, “Vivek Kundra will bring a depth of experience in the technology arena and a commitment to lowering the cost of government operations to this position. I have directed him to work to ensure that we are using the spirit of American innovation and the power of technology to improve performance and lower the cost of government operations. As Chief Information Officer, he will play a key role in making sure our government is running in the most secure, open, and efficient way possible.”

The following announcement was made today:

Vivek Kundra, Federal Chief Information Officer
Vivek Kundra formerly served in Mayor Fenty’s cabinet as the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for the District of Columbia, responsible for technology operations and strategy for 86 agencies. He has been recognized among the top 25 CTO’s in the country and as the 2008 IT Executive of the Year for his pioneering work to drive transparency, engage citizens and lower the cost of government operations. Kundra is also recognized for his leadership in public safety communications, cyber security and IT portfolio management. Before Kundra came to the District, Governor Timothy M. Kaine appointed him Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Technology for the Commonwealth of Virginia, the first dual cabinet role in the state’s history. Kundra’s diverse record also includes technology and public policy experience in private industry and academia. He is a graduate of the University of Virginia’s Sorensen Institute for Political Leadership and holds a MS in Information Technology from the University of Maryland.

Filed under: Analysis, Biography, Business, cyber security, cyber war, Doctrine, government, History, Intelligence Community, Internet, Life, Military, News, Policy, Politics, Strategy, Technology, Terrorism, Training, War, American innovation, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Technology, Chief Information Officer, chief technology officer, CIO, CTO, cyber security, District of Columbia, enterprise architecture, Federal CIO, federal government, federal information technology investments, federal technology spending, Federdal Chief Information Officer, government operations, information privacy, information security, information sharing, IT Executive of the Year, IT portfolio management, Mayor Fenty, Obama, Policy, safety communications, strategic planning, Strategy, system interoperability, Technology, technology agenda, technology arena, Timothy Kaine, transparency, US Governors, US Mayors, US president, Virginia, Vivek Kundra

The Highlighter: Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency – Part V

A Report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency

Part V includes highlights of:

• Section 4 – Regulate for Cybersecurity
  

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CSWW is not affiliated with CSIS or the commission that produced this report. The use of “we,” “our,” “us,” etc., throughout the highlights of this report refers to the members of the CSIS Commission and not to CSWW.
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The Highlights:

4
Regulate for Cybersecurity

Recommendations

• The president should task the NOC to work with appropriate regulatory agencies to develop and issue standards and guidance for securing critical cyber infrastructure, which those agencies would then apply in their own regulations.

• The NOC should work with the appropriate regulatory agencies and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop regulations for industrial control systems (ICS). The government could reinforce regulation by making the development of secure control systems an element of any economic stimulus package…
• The NOC should immediately determine the extent to which government-owned critical infrastructures are secure from cyber attack…
• The president should direct the NOC and the federal Chief Information Officers Council, working with industry, to develop and implement security guidelines for the procurement of IT products (with software as the first priority).
• The president should task the National Security Agency (NSA) and NIST, working with international partners, to reform the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP).
• The president should take steps to increase the use of secure Internet protocols. The president should direct OMB and the NOC to develop mandatory requirements for agencies to contract only with telecommunications carriers that use secure Internet protocols.

Filed under: Analysis, Biography, Business, cyber security, cyber war, Doctrine, government, History, Intelligence Community, Internet, Life, Military, News, Policy, Politics, Strategy, Technology, Terrorism, The Highlighter, Training, War, acquisition rules, Chief Information Officers Council, CSIS, cyber security, electric grid, energy, FDCC, federal acquisition, Federal Desktop Core Configuration, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Power Act, FERC, finance, FISMA, government mandate, ICS, ICT, industrial control systems, information technology, internet protocols, IT, national defense, National Information Assurance Partnership, National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Security Agency, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, NERC, NIAP, NIST, NOC, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NSA, OMB, regulate, regulation, SCADA, SEC, supervisory control and data acquisition, US Air Force, US president, Y2K